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a b s t r a c t 
Preference aggregation in Group Decision Making (GDM) is a substantial problem that has received a 
lot of research attention. Decision problems involving fuzzy preference relations constitute an important 
class within GDM. Legacy approaches dealing with the latter type of problems can be classified into in- 
direct approaches, which involve deriving a group preference matrix as an intermediate step, and direct 
approaches, which deduce a group preference ranking based on individual preference rankings. Although 
the work on indirect approaches has been extensive in the literature, there is still a scarcity of research 
dealing with the direct approaches. In this paper we present a direct approach towards aggregating sev- 
eral fuzzy preference relations on a set of alternatives into a single weighted ranking of the alternatives. 
By mapping the pairwise preferences into transitions probabilities, we are able to derive a preference 
ranking from the stationary distribution of a stochastic matrix. Interestingly, the ranking of the alter- 
natives obtained with our method corresponds to the optimizer of the Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
of a particular Bradley-Terry-Luce model. Furthermore, we perform a theoretical sensitivity analysis of 
the proposed method supported by experimental results and illustrate our approach towards GDM with 
a concrete numerical example. This work opens avenues for solving GDM problems using elements of 
probability theory, and thus, provides a sound theoretical fundament as well as plausible statistical inter- 
pretation for the aggregation of expert opinions in GDM. 
© 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 















Group decision making (GDM) settings involve a group of indi- 
iduals (experts), where each member of the group expresses her 
references over a set of alternatives. Illustrative examples range 
rom parliamentary groups working to converge on a political deci- 
ion, to groups of friends deciding on the best choice of restaurant 
or a dinner. The aim of GDM is to identify the most preferred al- 
ernative for the whole group of individuals, or to derive a ranking 
f the alternatives that reflects the preferences of the group. ∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: anis.yazidi@oslomet.no (A. Yazidi), viedma@decsai.ugr.es (E.H. 
iedma). 
ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2021.05.030 
377-2217/© 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article uThe literature proposes many different forms of expressing pref- 
rences of experts ( Capuano, Chiclana, Fujita, Herrera-Viedma, & 
oia, 2017 ). Some of the most popular ones are the following: 
• Rankings , which are ranked lists of the alternatives from the 
most preferred to the least preferred one ( Seo & Sakawa, 1985 ). 
• Utility vectors , where each component of the vector describes 
the utility of the corresponding alternative, which can be seen 
as its ordinal strength ( Tanino, 1990 ). These are sometimes 
called priority vectors or weighted rankings . We use the latter 
expression throughout this paper. 
• Preference relations , where preference is expressed as a binary 
relation on the set of alternatives ( Kitainik, 2012 ). 
• Fuzzy Preference Relations (FPRs) , which relax the binary pref- 
erence relations with the possibility of expressing degrees of nder the CC BY license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 























































































































preference among the alternatives ( Pedrycz, Ekel, & Parreiras, 
2010 ). Preference degrees can be assessed using linguistic term 
sets which can be more natural for human expert to articulate 
( Ureña, Kou, Wu, Chiclana, & Herrera-Viedma, 2019 ). 
FPR is the most commonly used representation for expressing 
references in a set of alternatives, in which an expert expresses 
er preferences as degrees of preference assigned to each pair of 
lternatives. The most common way to store these pairwise pref- 
rences is in the form of a preference matrix. The main reason 
ehind the popularity of the preference relations comes from a 
nown fact from psychology studies that human beings are better 
t comparing pairs of alternatives than at coming up with a com- 
lete preference ordering of a set of alternatives ( Ureña, Chiclana, 
orente-Molinera, & Herrera-Viedma, 2015 ). 
Within GDM involving FPR, there are two main families of ap- 
roaches: direct approaches and indirect approaches. The indirect 
pproaches first compute the group opinion in the form of an FPR 
we will call it a group or a collective FPR), usually expressed as a 
reference matrix, and then find a solution which is a (weighted) 
anking of the different alternatives based on the collective FPR. 
he collective preference matrix is generally derived by apply- 
ng an aggregation operator to the individual ones. On the other 
and, the direct approaches do not involve constructing a collec- 
ive preference matrix describing the group opinion as an inter- 
ediate step. They first compute an individual ranking for each 
xpert based on her FPR, and then the group ranking is obtained 
rom the individual rankings of the experts using an aggregation 
perator. For excellent surveys on consensus processes and pref- 
rence aggregation we refer the reader to the comprehensive sur- 
eys ( Cabrerizo, Moreno, Pérez, & Herrera-Viedma, 2010; Herrera- 
iedma, Cabrerizo, Kacprzyk, & Pedrycz, 2014 ) and to the book by 
errera-Viedma et al. (2011) . 
While studies on indirect approaches for aggregating pairwise 
references abound, the direct approaches are not as popular, al- 
hough there are a few exceptions ( Dong, Xu, & Yu, 2009; Fan, Ma,
iang, Sun, & Ma, 2006 ). Herrera and his collaborators ( Herrera, 
errera-Viedma, & Verdegay, 1996 ) pioneered the first direct ap- 
roach towards GDM based on FPR. However, the work in this di- 
ection is very scarce, although it is known that direct approaches 
sually possess two desirable properties, internal consistency and 
areto principle of the social choice theory ( Dong & Zhang, 2014 ). 
One of the few available direct approaches in the literature was 
ecently presented by Dong et al. in ( Dong & Zhang, 2014 ). There,
he authors extended the original direct approach presented in 
 Herrera et al., 1996 ) in order to support (i) different preferences 
epresentations, and (ii) a consensus process in the form of rounds 
here experts are required to adjust their pairwise preferences. In- 
erestingly, in order to achieve consensus, Dong et al. resort to a 
orm of a feedback based on measuring consensus using the indi- 
idual weighted rankings of the experts. This is distinct from the 
ain stream of research in FPR since consensus degree computa- 
ion is not based on weighted rankings of individual experts but 
ather based on elements from the preference matrices. The ap- 
roach by Dong et al. allows the experts to update their prefer- 
nce matrices in order to reach a consensus, defining two quan- 
ities, namely the cardinal consensus degree, based on the vec- 
or representation inspired by ( Chiclana, Herrera, Herrera-Viedma, 
 Martínez, 2003; Dong, Xu, Li, & Feng, 2010 ) and the ordinal 
onsensus degree inspired by ( Herrera-Viedma, Alonso, Chiclana, & 
errera, 2007; Herrera-Viedma, Herrera, & Chiclana, 2002 ). 
In this article, we take a direct approach towards group de- 
ision making given fuzzy preferences over a set of alternatives. 
e propose a method for aggregating the opinions of several 
xperts, which are expressed as FPRs, into a single weighted 
anking of the alternatives. Similarly to the work in ( Dopazo & 1031 artínez-Céspedes, 2017 ), we transform the preference matrices 
nto stochastic matrices, and then use the theory of Markov chains 
nd random walks to compute rankings over the alternatives, as 
mplemented in the PageRank algorithm ( Gleich, 2015 ). One main 
ifference in this paper compared to the method in ( Dopazo & 
artínez-Céspedes, 2017 ) lays in the definition of the stochastic 
atrix. In ( Dopazo & Martínez-Céspedes, 2017 ) the stochastic ma- 
rix is simply a column-normalization of the preference matrix so 
hat its entries are proportional to the corresponding preferences 
nd represent the probabilities (relative strengths) of dominance 
etween the alternatives. In our framework we determine the en- 
ries of the stochastic matrix similarly as in ( Negahban, Oh, & Shah, 
012; 2016 ) and they represent the probabilities of transiting be- 
ween the corresponding alternatives in the way that the prob- 
bility of transition from alternative x to alternative y is propor- 
ional to the degree of preference of y to x . The stationary vectors, 
owever, have similar interpretation in both our approach and the 
pproach in ( Dopazo & Martínez-Céspedes, 2017 ) as their entries 
epresent preference strengths of the corresponding alternatives in 
oth the cases. The difference is that the normalization we use 
eads to a stationary vector that satisfies the global balance prop- 
rty with respect to the preference matrix: the preference strength 
f an alternative depends on whether the alternative dominates 
eak or strong alternatives. This is the core idea of the Rank Cen- 
rality method ( Negahban et al., 2012; 2016 ) and we discuss it in
ore detail in Section 3.1 . 
Notice that assigning and interpreting a degree of preference is 
ot straightforward. Using a probability value to quantify an FPR 
ives an intuitive interpretation of FPR itself and, moreover, en- 
bles to establish a link between probability theory and preference 
ggregation. Furthermore, we prove that the weighted ranking ob- 
ained as a result of the method presented in this paper corre- 
ponds to the result of Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) of 
he Plackett-Luce model ( Plackett, 1975 ). 
There is a body of literature on methods that compute weighted 
anking from preference matrices based on optimization tech- 
iques such as least square method ( Gong, 2008 ), least deviation 
ethod ( Xu & Da, 2005 ), multiobjective optimization ( Fernandez 
 Leyva, 2004 ), new fuzzy linear programming method (FLPM) 
 Zhu & Xu, 2014 ), goal programming ( Fan et al., 2006 ), etc. Al-
hough these methods are shown to provide good results, they re- 
ay on human-engineered techniques or heuristics and do not pro- 
ide plausible theoretical interpretation of their computation and 
odelling steps. Our work is distinct from the latter works as the 
ay we derive a ranking vector can be explained using probabil- 
ty theory and thus we provide a theoretical interpretation of our 
ramework. 
Indeed, as mentioned above, our work is directly inspired by a 
ecent work on Rank Centrality algorithm ( Negahban et al., 2012; 
016 ), which aggregates a set of pairwise comparisons of alterna- 
ives into a global weighted ranking. In ranking based on pairwise 
omparisons, the goal is to rank, for example, football teams based 
n results of played matches between them. This problem has an 
bvious analogy with ranking of alternatives based on pairwise ex- 
ressed preferences, but despite the vast amount of work on rank- 
ng alternatives based on preferences, to the best of our knowl- 
dge, the ideas of Rank Centrality have not yet been adopted in the 
ontext of fuzzy preference aggregation. We argue that by properly 
ransforming the fuzzy preferences into probabilities of transition 
etween alternatives, probability theory can naturally be applied in 
reference aggregation and, consequently, we hope that our frame- 
ork can inspire further research in that direction. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In 
ection 2 we introduce the relevant background and the fun- 
amental concepts of the state of the art in fuzzy preferences. 
ection 3 presents our approach for aggregating preferences based 


































































































n the concept of Markov chains and discusses the conditions un- 
er which some desirable properties for the aggregation processes 
old. In Section 4 we provide a theoretical sensitivity analysis 
f the proposed aggregation method. Concrete numerical example 
howing the consistency of our framework followed by an exper- 
mental sensitivity analysis is given in Section 5 . Final discussions 
nd conclusions are provided in Section 6 . 
. Background and preliminary concepts 
In the following we assume that E = { e 1 , . . . , e m } is a set of
xperts and X = { x 1 , . . . , x n } is a set of alternatives. We use the
ollowing definition of a fuzzy preference relation as provided in 
 Herrera-Viedma, Herrera, Chiclana, & Luque, 2004 ). 
A Fuzzy Preference Relation (FPR) P on a set of alternatives X is 
 fuzzy set on the product set X × X , i.e. a relation on X character- 
zed by a membership function 
P : X × X → [0 , 1] . (1) 
p i j = μP (x i , x j ) is interpreted as the preference degree of the alter-
ative x i over the alternative x j . A usual natural assumption is that 
p i j + p ji = 1 , for every i, j ∈ { 1 , . . . , n } , i.e. that P is additive recip-
ocal . If p i j > 0 . 5 , we say that x i is preferred to x j ; if p i j = 0 . 5 , we
ay that we are indifferent between x i and x j ; and p i j = 1 indicates
hat x i is absolutely preferred to x j . The additive reciprocity prop- 
rty ensures that p ii = 0 . 5 and p i j > 0 . 5 iff p ji < 0 . 5 . 
When the set X is not too big, it is convenient to represent 
 as an n × n matrix of preference values, where n = | X| , i.e. P =
 p i j ] n ×n . We call this a preference matrix . For convenience, we use
he same notation for both the fuzzy preference relation and the 
orresponding preference matrix. 
We assume that each of the m experts expresses her prefer- 
nces independently of each other and in the form of a fuzzy pref- 
rence relation. Let us denote by P (k ) the FPR of the k -th expert
nd let P (k ) = [ p (k ) 
i j 
] n ×n be the corresponding preference matrix. 
An indirect approach to GDM aims at reaching a collective opin- 
on by first aggregating all the individual preference matrices into a 
ollective FPR. A direct approach would predict the collective opin- 
on or a GDM-”target”, in general, by turning experts’ FPR matrices 
nto vectors whose entries measure the ranking of the alternatives. 
ore formally, a weighted ranking can be defined as a function 
 : X → R , which maps each alternative in X into its absolute pref-
rence strength. 1 Aggregating the individual ranking vectors yields 
 possible consensus target for the set of individuals. 
Whatever approach one chooses, direct or indirect, there are 
wo main phases in GDM based on FPR, an aggregation phase and 
n exploitation phase . 
In the aggregation phase, the corresponding individual prefer- 
nce values (corresponding entries in FPR matrices or ranking vec- 
ors) are aggregated into a collective preference value using an ag- 
regation operator . 
There are many aggregation operators, such as weighted aver- 
ge (WA), fuzzy majority, etc. One popular example is the opera- 
or called Ordered Weighted Averaging (OWA) due to ( Yager, 1988 ). 
he WA and the OWA operators presume we have a list of weights 
 = (w 1 , . . . , w m ) , w k ∈ [0 , 1] , k = 1 , . . . , m , such that 
∑ 
w k = 1 . Let
p 1 , . . . , p m be a list of preference values to be aggregated. While
he WA operator is defined as a simple weighted average of the 
references: 
A ( p 1 , . . . , p m ) = 
m ∑ 
k = 1 
w k p k , (2) 1 The ordering of the alternatives is implicit in each weighted ranking and follows 
rom the linear order of the real numbers: Alternatives assigned a higher number 
ank higher, and alternatives assigned the same number rank the same. 
f
M
1032 he OWA operator is defined as 
WA ( p 1 , . . . , p m ) = 
m ∑ 
k = 1 
w k p σ ( k ) , (3) 
here σ is a permutation of the set { 1 , . . . , m } such that p σ (k +1) ≥
p σ (k ) for k ∈ { 0 , . . . , m − 1 } . 
In the case of WA, the weights w = (w 1 , . . . , w m ) can be as-
umed to be corresponding to the importance of the experts in 
he group with respect to the particular decision making problem, 
r to the confidence of the experts in their opinions. In the case 
f OWA, assigning weights w enables weighting differently prefer- 
nces of different strength, giving more value to stronger prefer- 
nces, for example. By choosing different w in WA and OWA, one 
an implement different aggregation operators. 
The exploitation phase is the phase of deducing a (weighted) 
anking vector based on a fuzzy preference relation (matrix). 
Two relevant approaches towards defining the ranking in this 
hase are ( Herrera et al., 1996 ): Quantifier-Guided Dominance De- 
ree (QGDD), where the rank of each alternative represents the 
ominance or importance of the alternative over the rest of the al- 
ernatives; and Quantifier-Guided Non-Dominance Degree (QGNDD), 
here the rank of each alternative represents the degree to which 
he alternative is not dominated by the rest of the alternatives. An 
lternative to QGDD and QGNDD is the Netflow method ( Bouyssou, 
992 ) which is also based on dominance of an alternative. 2 More 
recisely, this method defines the rank of an alternative as the 
ifference between the inflow and the outflow of preference from 
t, which, under the additive reciprocity assumption ( p i j + p ji = 1 ),
educes to the following expression: 
F ( x i ) = 
n ∑ 
j =1 , j = i 
p i j −
n ∑ 




j =1 , j = i 




j =1 , j = i 
p i j −




otice that the Netflow method is related to the Copeland vot- 
ng rule in ( Marchant, 1996 ). An axiomatic characterization of the 
opeland rule can be found in ( Henriet, 1985 ). 
The indirect and the direct approaches towards GDM with FPR 
iffer in the way the phases of aggregation and exploitation are 
ombined: In the indirect approaches, one first applies the aggre- 
ation phase to the set of individual FPRs in order to obtain one 
ollective FPR. Then the exploitation phase is applied to the col- 
ective FPR to give the final (weighted) ranking. In the direct ap- 
roaches, the exploitation phase is applied first at each individual 
PR to give the individual rankings. Then the aggregation phase is 
pplied at the individual rankings to find the final collective rank- 
ng ( Herrera et al., 1996 ). Fig. 1 highlights these differences be- 
ween the two approaches. 
Note that aggregating opinions of experts into a group opin- 
on by any of the above approaches does not necessarily amount 
o reaching a consensus. To guarantee agreement between the ex- 
erts, one could consider a third phase after the two phases de- 
cribed above, in which one forces the individual opinions of the 
xperts to get close to each other ( Palomares, Estrella, Martínez, & 
errera, 2014 ). This narrowing phase can be implemented in two 
ifferent ways: (i) through automatic approaches without expert 
eedback, or (ii) through approaches with feedback on preferences 2 Note that the Netflow method has also been defined in ( García-Lapresta, 
artínez-Panero, & Meneses, 2009 ) as the broad Borda count. 
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3 In the remainder of the paper we will use the terms alternative and state inter- 
changeably. here there is a moderator that will try to reduce the divergence 
f opinions between the experts. In both of these approaches con- 
ensus is considered to be a stage where all the individual opin- 
ons are sufficiently close to each other. Quantitatively, the close- 
ess can be measured as a distance in the “space of opinions” ei- 
her between each opinion and the collective (aggregated) opinion, 
r between pairs of individual opinions. 
Having described briefly the decision framework and the main 
pproaches for quantitative analysis in GDM, in the next section 
e propose a new method to address the aggregation and ex- 
loitation processes and we analyse its properties. 
. A rank centrality-based preference aggregation method 
In this section we introduce a method for aggregating the 
uzzy preference relations of the experts e 1 , . . . , e m into a collective 
eighted ranking of the alternatives x 1 , . . . , x n . We start by provid-
ng a way of transforming a preference matrix over the alterna- 
ives into a weighted ranking vector of the alternatives, which will 
e used in the exploitation phase of the general method. Then we 
rovide the full GDM procedure. At the end we prove that, un- 
er the assumption that detailed balance relation is satisfied, the 
roposed method satisfies some desirable properties of aggrega- 
ion processes. 
.1. From preference matrices to ranking vectors 
We consider an n × n preference matrix P over the alternatives 
 1 , . . . , x n ( n ≥ 2 ) which is additive reciprocal, i.e. a matrix whose
lements p i j are in the unit interval and obey the condition 
p i j = 1 − p ji . (5) 
 value p i j > 0 . 5 means that the alternative x i is preferred over x j ,
hile p i j = 0 . 5 means that no preference between x i and x j exists.
Inspired by recent work on ranking based on a dataset of pair- 
ise comparisons ( Negahban et al., 2012; 2016 ), our approach is 
ased on a transformation of the given preference matrix P into a 
tochastic matrix S defined in the following way: 
 i j = 
1 
n − 1 p ji , (6a) 1033  ii = 1 −
1 
n − 1 
n ∑ 
j =1 , j = i 
p ji . (6b) 
The division by n − 1 is introduced for normalization purposes, 
 
j s i j = 1 , and to guarantee that each element s i j is proportional 
o the corresponding p ji and fulfills the condition 0 ≤ s i j ≤ 1 . Each 
ow can then be seen as a probability distribution and the matrix 
as the matrix of transition probabilities of a Markov chain with n 
tates. 3 The element s i j corresponds to the probability of transiting 
rom a state x i to a state x j and, as defined in Eq. (6a) , this prob-
bility equals the product of the probability of choosing randomly 
he state x j among the n − 1 states different from x j and adopting 
hat state with probability p ji . This ensures that the probability of 
ransition from alternative x i to alternative x j is proportional to the 
reference of x j over x i . Notice that it is always possible to con- 
truct such a stochastic matrix, even if there are missing entries 
n the preference matrix P , i.e. if there is incomplete information 
 Herrera-Viedma et al., 2007 ). 
We impose that the preference matrix P fulfills the condition 
p i j  = 0 , (7) 
or every i, j ∈ { 1 , . . . , n } , and therefore also p i j  = 1 , for every i, j ∈
 1 , . . . , n } , which means that an alternative is never completely
excluded” against another one and also never “fully dominates”
nother one. (This may be achieved by replacing a zero prefer- 
nce with an arbitrarily small ε > 0 preference). It is easy to see 
hat under this particular condition the matrix S is irreducible and 
periodic (see Appendix A ). Then, according to Perron-Frobenius 
heorem ( Horn & Johnson, 1990; MacCluer, 20 0 0 ), S being an ir- 
educible aperiodic stochastic matrix, there is a unique stationary 
olution π satisfying: 
= πS . (8) 
The stationary distribution π can be computed iteratively via 
 random walk on the Markov chain defined by the stochastic ma- 
rix S, or analytically via the computation of the eigenvector associ- 

















































































ted with the highest eigenvalue of the matrix S. We will interpret 
he stationary distribution π as a weighted ranking, where each 
omponent of the vector π (each “weight”) represents the impor- 
ance of the corresponding alternative with respect to the whole 
et of alternatives, and we will refer to this method for computing 
ankings as a Rank Centrality (RC) method ( Negahban, Oh, & Shah, 
016 ). We call the corresponding matrix S a centrality matrix . 
To justify the above interpretation of the stationary vector π , 
e analyse its relation with the initially given preference matrix P . 




π j s ji . (9) 
he product π j s ji in the above sum represents the probability of 
ransitioning from x j to x i adjusted by the weight of x j and, simi- 
arly as in ( Dopazo & Martínez-Céspedes, 2017 ), can be interpreted 
s the relative importance of alternative x i with respect to the al- 
ernative x j . Then, since πi , according to Eq. (9) , is a sum of such
roducts, it can be interpreted as the (absolute) importance of x i . 
ow, according to Eq. (6a) , the transition probabilities s ji are pro- 
ortional to preferences p i j , hence we can interpret π j s ji as rela- 
ive preference strength of x i with respect to x j , and πi as (absolute) 
reference strength of x i . 
There are two important properties of the RC method. The first 
roperty is that the ranking dynamics follows a continuous time 
arkov chain in global balance, and the respective balance equa- 
ion can be easily derived from Eq. (6) and Eq. (8) . Namely, from
q. (9) we obtain: 
i = πi s ii + 
n ∑ 
j =1 , j = i 
π j s ji , (10) 
hich is equivalent to 
1 − s ii ) πi = 
n ∑ 
j =1 , j = i 
π j s ji . (11) 
rom Eq. (6) we have 
 − s ii = 
n ∑ 
j =1 , j = i 
s i j , (12) 
hich together with Eq. (11) and Eq. (6a) leads to the following 
quations 
n ∑ 
j =1 , j = i 
s i j πi = 
n ∑ 
j =1 , j = i 
s ji π j 
n ∑ 
j =1 , j = i 
p ji πi = 
n ∑ 
j =1 , j = i 
p i j π j , (13) 
hich we call the global balance equations. Notice that the stronger 
ondition which assumes a term-by-term equality between the 
ums in Eq. (13) , for every i ∈ { 1 , . . . , n } , is called a detailed balance .
e discuss the case of a detailed balance in a subsequent section. 
The second property is given by the relation between the com- 
onents of the stationary solution (ranking) and the initial prefer- 
nce degrees that follows directly from the second global balance 
quation: 
i = 
1 ∑ n 
j =1 , j = i p ji 
n ∑ 
j =1 , j = i 
p i j π j . (14) 
Note that if we did not have the terms π j on the right hand- 
ide of the Eq. (14) , then the method would have been equivalent 
o the Netflow method since πi would be proportional to 
∑ n 
j  = i p i j 1034 hich is the case for NF (x i ) too as seen in Eq. (4) . However, hav-
ng π j on the right-hand side of Eq. (14) reflects the idea of cen- 
rality ranking. Namely, the importance of each alternative x j  = x i 
uantified by π j is taken into account when determining πi . Thus, 
eak alternatives that have low π j due to being dominated by 
any other alternatives will not contribute much to the increase 
f πi even if p i j is large, because one needs to consider the prod- 
ct p i j π j and not only p i j as in the classical Netflow method. In- 
ormally, this means that beating weak alternatives, i.e. alternatives 
ith low π j , does not increase much the ranking. This is one of the 
ore ideas of the Rank Centrality method ( Negahban et al., 2016 ). 
.2. The GDM method 
Our framework for preference aggregation consists of the fol- 
owing subsequent steps: 
1. Consider a set of m experts E = { e 1 , . . . , e m } . Each expert e k ,
1 ≤ k ≤ m , has a pairwise preference matrix P (k ) over the set 
of alternatives X = { x 1 , . . . , x n } . 
2. Using Eq. (6) , for each matrix P (k ) we compute the correspond- 
ing stochastic matrix S (k ) . 
3. We solve Eq. (8) for each expert e k , i.e. we solve π = πS (k ) , for
k = 1 , . . . , m , and denote the unique solution by π(k ) . The vector
π(k ) = [ π(k ) 
1 
, . . . , π(k ) n ] defines a weighted ranking of the alter- 
natives corresponding to the preferences of the expert e k over 
the set of n alternatives. As observed in the previous section, 
π(k ) 
i 
can be interpreted as the preference strength of the alter- 
native x i according to expert e k . Then, since π
(k ) is a probability 
distribution over X , it can be seen as representing the expert 
e k ’s distribution of preference strengths over X . 
4. We define the collective ranking vector as the arithmetic aver- 
age of the individual ranking vectors, determining its compo- 










Notice that, by taking the arithmetic average of the individual 
anking vectors as the aggregated state π(c) , one naturally defines 
he consensual stage with respect to that aggregated state: perfect 
onsensus occurs when all the experts arrive at the same opinion 
iven by π(c) . Moreover, such definition of perfect consensus state 
eflects the assumption that the perfect consensus state should 
ot be near to some specific expert and in prejudice to the other. 
rom a more physical perspective, one can take π(c) as the cen- 
er of mass of the set of opinions of the m experts (expressed as 
eighted rankings), in the space of all the possible opinions, i.e. it 








) = 0 , for every i = 1 , . . . , n . In
ther words, using the arithmetic average in the aggregation phase 
f the GDM process provides a safe alternative to reaching a con- 
ensus, in the absence of a special third phase for that purpose in 
he process. 
An extension to WA or OWA is straightforward and does not 
ompromise the bulk of our framework: For any choice of weights, 
hich should depend on the specific set of experts and/or the spe- 
ific decision making context, rankings and preferences will still be 
reatable within our framework. 
.3. The detailed balance case 
Recall that the stationary vector satisfies the detailed balance 
time reversibility) property if the following equation holds: 
i s i j = π j s ji , (16) 
or every i, j ∈ { 1 , . . . , n } . 































































































In this section we assume that Eq. (16) holds for the elements 
f the stochastic matrix S and the components of the correspond- 
ng stationary vector obtained in steps 2. and 3. in the previous 
ection. Then, combining Eq. (5) , Eq. (6) and Eq. (16) , one arrives
o the following equation equivalent to Eq. (16) : 
p i j = 
πi 
πi + π j 
. (17) 
q. (17) highlights the correspondence between pairwise expressed 
references in the form of a preference matrix and the prefer- 
nce strengths assigned to the alternatives in the corresponding 
eighted ranking vector. Note that Eq. (17) implies transitivity 
f the preference matrix P (from p i j > 0 . 5 and p jk > 0 . 5 follows
p ik > 0 . 5 ). 
Notice that Eq. (17) means that the preference relation P satis- 
es the Bradley-Terry-Luce (BTL) model ( van Berkum, 1997 ). It was 
emonstrated also by Rajkumar and Shivani ( Rajkumar & Agarwal, 
014 ) that the time-reversibility of S is equivalent to the existence 
f an underlying BTL model that describes the preferences in P ac- 
ording to their preference strengths π . 
At this juncture, we shall present a theorem that provides 
 mathematical interpretation of the stationary distribution of 
he centrality matrix S corresponding to the preference matrix P , 
amely that the stationary distribution of S is a maximum likeli- 
ood estimate of the BTL model underlying P . 
heorem 1. Let the BTL pairwise comparison model be defined by 
 parameter vector π = [ π1 , . . . , πn ] , πi ∈ (0 , 1) , i.e. p i j = πi πi + π j , for
, j ∈ { 1 , . . . , n } , where p i j = P (x i > x j ) . 4 Let P = [ p i j ] be a preference
atrix and let S be its corresponding centrality matrix defined by Eq. 
6a) and Eq. (6b) . Then the Maximum Likelihood Estimate (MLE) of 
he BTL model satisfies the global balance equation with P . 
The proof of the above theorem can be found in Appendix B . 
he theorem states that the MLE of the parameter vector π of the 
TL model for pairwise comparisons of n alternatives, π ∗, satisfies 
he global balance property given in Eq. (13) with the ground truth 
robabilities P of the model. This means that π ∗ is a stationary 
istribution of the centrality matrix S corresponding to P , since the 
lobal balance equations in Eq. (13) are derived from the stationary 
istribution in Eq. (9) through a series of equivalence steps. Finally, 
ince the stationary distribution of S is unique on the unit interval, 
e can conclude that it is equal to π ∗, the MLE of the BTL model
n which P describes the probabilities of the pairwise comparisons. 
In Section 3.1 we discussed two general properties of the RC 
ethod. Here, we observe that in the special case when the rank- 
ng vectors determined in step 3. of the GDM procedure satisfy de- 
ailed balance, i.e. the equations (16) and (17) , two desirable prop- 
rties of the aggregation processes are satisfied: internal consis- 
ency and the Pareto principle. We interpret these properties simi- 
arly as in ( Dong & Zhang, 2014 ) and ( Chiclana, Herrera, & Herrera-
iedma, 2002 ). 
Internal Consistency. In our setting, internal consistency can 
e understood as the consistency of the process that transforms 
ach expert’s opinion from its initial form of a preference matrix, 
hrough a stochastic matrix, to its end form of a weighted ranking 
ector. In other words, the property of internal consistency is sat- 
sfied if the following holds: The derived individual ranking of the 
 -th expert by the procedure described in Section 3.1 , reflects her 
nitial preference relation, ranking higher (assigning higher weights 
o) the alternatives she prefers more: p (k ) 
i j 
≥ p (k ) 
ji 
if and only if 4 x i > x j can be interpreted as “x i wins over x j ”, “x i is preferred to x j ”, etc., and 
(x i > x j ) is the probability of this event that is to be estimated from a number of 
airwise comparisons in the set of alternatives X = { x 1 , . . . , x n } . 
s
t
1035 (k ) 
i 
≥ π(k ) 
j 
, for every i, j ∈ { 1 , . . . , n } . This property follows imme-
iately from Eq. (17) . 
Pareto principle. The general interpretation of the Pareto princi- 
le (unanimity) in the social-choice theory is as follows: If all the 
xperts agree upon a certain issue, then this agreement is reflected 
n the derived collective opinion. In our framework, it can be inter- 
reted as the following requirement: If all the experts prefer the 
lternative x i over the alternative x j in their individual preference 
elations, then x i ranks higher than x j in the collective ranking. 
ore formally, if p (k ) 
i j 
≥ p (k ) 
ji 
, for every k = 1 , . . . , m , then π c 
i 
≥ π c 
j 
.
his is a consequence of Eq. (17) and Eq. (15) : If p (k ) 
i j 
≥ p (k ) 
ji 
, for
very k = 1 , . . . , m , then, from Eq. (17) it follows that π(k ) 
i 
≥ π(k ) 
j 
,






Note that the above two properties are based on qualitative 
omparisons between preferences where neither the magnitude 
f preferences and preference strengths nor the information on 
hether the dominated alternatives are weak or strong, is taken 
nto account. Since these are crucial elements in the Rank Central- 
ty method that enable deriving meaningful rankings, they justify 
he violation of the properties of internal consistency and Pareto 
ptimality in the general case. This is clearly demonstrated by our 
xample in Section 5.1 . It would be interesting, however, to exam- 
ne the sensitivity of the latter properties to changes in the initial 
atrices. 
. Sensitivity Analysis (SA) 
In this section we perform a theoretical sensitivity analysis of 
he Rank Centrality method. More specifically, we analyse the sen- 
itivity of the output of the procedure described in Section 3.1 in 
ace of small variations of the input, i.e. small variations in the val- 
es of the matrix parameters. The aim of this analysis is to under- 
tand how the centrality-based ranking of the alternatives is af- 
ected by small changes in the experts’ opinions. As a basis for our 
nalysis we use the derivatives of the output, and we largely apply 
esults from Golub and Meyer ( Golub & Meyer, 1986 ). 
Recall that the input of the RC ranking method is an n × n pref- 
rence matrix P ( n ≥ 2 ) that is additive reciprocal, i.e. a matrix 
hose elements p i j are in the unit interval and obey the condi- 
ion 
p i j = 1 − p ji . (18) 
We consider an ε-perturbation of the matrix P resulting in a 
ew matrix ˜ P (ε) , where the preferences associated with one par- 
icular pair of alternatives (x k , x l ) change as follows: 
5 
˜ pkl = p kl + ε (19) 
ith 0 < ε 	 1 , and consequently, from Eq. (5) , 
˜ plk = 1 − ˜ pkl = p lk − ε. (20) 
Let S and ˜ S (ε) be the centrality matrices of P and ˜ P (ε) respec- 
ively. Note that ˜ P (0) = P and ˜ S (0) = S. Whenever there is no con-
usion, we will omit the dependency on ε from the notation. Ac- 
ording to Eq. (6) , the corresponding entries of ˜ S (ε) are then given 
y: 
˜ kl = 
1 
n − 1 ˜ plk = s kl −
ε
n − 1 , 
˜ lk = s lk + 
ε
n − 1 . 5 For simplicity, but also for clarity of the observations we make, we restrict to 
he case of varying the preferences related to only one pair of alternatives. 














































































a  As for the diagonal terms, the only terms affected by the per- 
urbation in the preference matrix are ˜ skk and ˜ sll : 
˜ kk = s kk + 
ε
n − 1 , 
˜ sll = s ll −
ε
n − 1 . 
All these variations can be written in a compact form for the 
entrality matrix as 
˜ 
 (ε) = S + S ε
here 
 ε = 
k l ⎛ 
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎝ 
⎞ 
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎠ 
0 . . . 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . . . . 
. . . 
0 . . . ε
n −1 . . . − εn −1 . . . 0 k 
. . . . . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . . . . 
. . . 
0 . . . ε
n −1 . . . − εn −1 . . . 0 l 
. . . . . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
0 . . . 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 
(23) 
heorem 2. Let ˜ π(ε) be the stationary distribution of ˜ S (ε) . Then 
∂ ˜ πi (ε) 
∂ε
= ˜ πk + ˜ πl 
n − 1 (t li − t ki ) πi , (24) 
here t ji denotes the mean first passage time from x i to x j , i.e. the
xpected number of steps to reach state x j for the first time starting 
rom state x i , in the unperturbed centrality matrix ˜ S (0) = S. 
The proof of Theorem 2 is given in Appendix C . Note that Eq.
24) implies
∂ ˜ πk (ε) 
∂ε
= ˜ πk + ̃  πl n −1 t lk πk > 0 and
∂ ̃  πl (ε) 
∂ε
= − ˜ πk + ̃  πl n −1 t kl πl < 0 
hich is expected. 
The perturbation of the preference associated with the pair 
x k , x l ) affects every component ˜ πi in the stationary distribution 
˜ (ε) of the centrality matrix ˜ S (ε) . For sufficiently small ε these 
omponents can be written as 6 
˜ i 
 πi + ε
(






1 + ε ˜ πk + ˜ πl 
n − 1 (t li − t ki ) 
)
. (25) 
quation (25) can be interpreted as follows: For similar first pas- 
age times between alternatives, the perturbation of preferences in 
 single alternative-pair has an effect in the stationary distribution 
hat is proportional to the amplitude of its components: dominant 
lternatives (higher rank) are more affected than other alternatives. 
One important consequence of Eq. (25) is that one can estimate 
rst passage times for all possible transitions between alternatives. 
ndeed, for k = i and l = i , since t kk = t ll = 0 by definition of first
assage time, Eq. (25) yields respectively 






n − 1 
ε
1 
˜ πk + ˜ πl 
, (26a) 
 kl = 
(
1 − ˜ πl 
πl 
)
n − 1 
ε
1 
˜ πk + ˜ πl 
. (26b) 
Equation (25) can be used to estimate the global deviation of 
˜ (ε) from the ”unperturbed” stationary distribution ˜ π(0) : 
| ̃  π(ε) − ˜ π(0) || 2 
 ε2 ( ̃  πk + ˜ πl ) 
2 
n − 1 〈 (t li − t ki ) 
2 π2 i 〉 i , (27) 6 It is worth mentioning that those two equations can be obtained too by apply- 





 (t li − t ki ) 2 π2 i 〉 i ≡ 1 n − 1 
n ∑ 
i =1 
(t li − t ki ) 2 π2 i . (28) 
his equation can be interpreted as follows. The global deviation of 
˜ (ε) from the unperturbed stationary distribution ˜ π(0) increases 
ith a ”weighted” second moment of the components of the un- 
erturbed stationary distribution. The weights for the component 
i are given by the difference between the first passage times from 
he corresponding alternative x i to the ”perturbed altrenatives” x k 
nd x l . 
This observation has two main consequences. First, the result 
n Eq. (27) uncovers another intuitive consequence: the compo- 
ents of the stationary distribution which remain unchanged by 
erturbing the preference for a pair of alternatives (x k , x l ) are 
hose for which the mean first passage times from the corre- 
ponding alternative x i to each alternative in the perturbed pair 
s equal, i.e. t ki = t li . In particular, perturbing the preference for 
airs of alternatives (x k , x l ) , which are evenly chosen in front of
ll other alternatives x i , i.e. t ki = t li for all i  = k and i  = l, will
ave no impact on the global preference strengths of the al- 
ernatives. Their impact is reduced to local changes of the am- 
litudes of each alternative in the perturbed pair, namely ˜ πk 
nd ˜ πl . 
Second, since deviations between perturbed and unperturbed 
tationary distribution are easy to measure in practice, Eq. (25) and 
27) provide new insight for establishing a framework to assess, 
t least at a qualitative level, the impact of local perturbations in 
he global dynamics towards consensus. Namely, the results of this 
ection have some implications when it comes to reaching consen- 
us worth pursuing as future work. In fact, we can formalize the 
onsensus problem as a gradient descent optimization where ex- 
erts need to do small adjustment to their preference matrices. 
he sensitivity of Markov chains to their transition probabilities 
an be used for computing the gradient in order to make the in- 
ividual stationary distribution of each expert move towards col- 
ective stationary distribution, by only adjusting the corresponding 
reference matrices. 
. Testing GDM with FPR: numerical experiments 
In this section we provide a concrete example of a GDM with 
PR using our method. We first compare the results of using our 
ethod against the results of using the popular Netflow method. 
hen, we perform an experimental sensitivity analyses to ex- 
lore what happens to the resulting ranking vector if we vary 
he entries of the initial preference matrices 1. by several values 
f ε > 0 applied to the same pair of alternatives; and 2. by a 
mall fixed ε > 0 applied to different pairs of alternatives in the 
atrix. 
We start by a numerical example highlighting the similarities 
nd differences between our algorithm and an algorithm that uses 
he standard Netflow (NF) method. 
.1. A numerical example 
We consider a first scenario with two experts ( m = 2 ) and four
lternatives ( n = 4 ) 7 The experts’ opinions are expressed in the fol-7 The code for performing the computations involved in the examples of this sec- 
ion is available at https://github.com/FMZennaro/GDM . The code can be straightfor- 
ardly changed for another number of experts. We have also tested for m = 3 and 
 = 4 , observing the same qualitative results. 



























































owing preference matrices: 
 1 = 
⎡ 
⎢ ⎣ 
0 . 50 0 . 60 0 . 30 0 . 10 
0 . 40 0 . 50 0 . 25 0 . 05 
0 . 70 0 . 75 0 . 50 0 . 55 
0 . 90 0 . 95 0 . 45 0 . 50 
⎤ 
⎥ ⎦ , (29a) 
 2 = 
⎡ 
⎢ ⎣ 
0 . 50 0 . 55 0 . 25 0 . 05 
0 . 45 0 . 50 0 . 25 0 . 05 
0 . 75 0 . 75 0 . 50 0 . 58 
0 . 95 0 . 95 0 . 42 0 . 50 
⎤ 
⎥ ⎦ . (29b) 
The entries of the preferences matrices P 1 and P 2 differ by 5% or 
ore, in a scale from 0 to 1. They can be provided by experts di-
ectly as numerical values or obtained, for example, by qualitative 
reference modelling. 8 
Assuming, for the sake of illustration, that these preferences 
epresent relationships between pairs of four different sport teams 
n two different leagues, the relationships in both leagues share 
wo common features: (i) the third team is moderately better than 
he first and the second team, while the fourth team is much bet- 
er than the first and the second team, and (ii) the third team 
eems, against intuition, to be better than the fourth team. We ob- 
erve what happens with the ranking vectors derived from these 
wo matrices when we apply our method. 
First of all, we normalize the preference matrices into stochastic 
atrices applying the Eq. (6) from Section 3.1 . This produces the 
ollowing centrality matrices: 
 1 = 
⎡ 
⎢ ⎣ 
0 . 33 0 . 13 0 . 23 0 . 30 
0 . 20 0 . 23 0 . 25 0 . 32 
0 . 10 0 . 08 0 . 67 0 . 15 
0 . 03 0 . 02 0 . 18 0 . 77 
⎤ 
⎥ ⎦ , 
 2 = 
⎡ 
⎢ ⎣ 
0 . 28 0 . 15 0 . 25 0 . 32 
0 . 18 0 . 25 0 . 25 0 . 32 
0 . 08 0 . 08 0 . 69 0 . 14 
0 . 02 0 . 02 0 . 19 0 . 77 
⎤ 
⎥ ⎦ . 
Then we apply two direct methods to derive a group ranking of 
he alternatives: 
• (NF+WA) : exploitation is performed by computing a per-expert 
ranking using Netflow, and then aggregation is performed by 
computing the final collective ranking using WA with uniform 
weights. 
• (RC+WA) : exploitation is performed by computing a per-expert 
ranking using Rank Centrality, and then aggregation is per- 
formed by computing the final collective ranking using WA 
with uniform weights. 
The output weighted rankings produced by these methods are 
he following: 
utput NF+WA = 
[
−0 . 383 −0 . 517 0 . 36 0 . 54 
]
utput RC+WA = 
[
0 . 087 0 . 069 0 . 388 0 . 456 
]
, 8 One can, for example, use linguistic preference modelling ( Herrera, Alonso, Chi- 
lana, & Herrera-Viedma, 2009 ), and even give each individual expert the possibility 
o use different preference domains to express their respective preferences. This is- 
ue is studied in ( Delgado, Herrera, Herrera-Viedma, & Martinez, 1998 ) where it is 
hown that in such heterogeneous decision contexts, it is possible to achieve a so- 
ution by first making the preferences uniform by converting them into FPRs over 









1037 orresponding to the following qualitative rankings: 
ank NF+WA = 
[
4 3 1 2 
]
ank RC+WA = 
[
4 3 1 2 
]
, 
here the i-th element is the index of the alternative with the i- 
h best preference strength (in this case, the 4-th alternative is the 
ost preferred, the 3-rd alternative is the second most preferred, 
nd so on). The results are identical, and they rank the fourth al- 
ernative at the top, which captures the intuition in the football 
eams example. Note that in the above example, we have violation 
f both Internal Consistency and Pareto Optimality at the alterna- 
ives 3 and 4, but we still obtain a meaningful ranking. 
We now consider a second scenario, again with two experts 
 m = 2 ) and four alternatives ( n = 4 ), but with the following pref-
rence matrices: 
 3 = 
⎡ 
⎢ ⎣ 
0 . 50 0 . 60 0 . 20 0 . 10 
0 . 40 0 . 50 0 . 15 0 . 05 
0 . 80 0 . 85 0 . 50 0 . 55 
0 . 90 0 . 95 0 . 45 0 . 50 
⎤ 
⎥ ⎦ , 
 4 = 
⎡ 
⎢ ⎣ 
0 . 50 0 . 55 0 . 15 0 . 05 
0 . 45 0 . 50 0 . 2 0 . 05 
0 . 85 0 . 8 0 . 50 0 . 58 
0 . 95 0 . 95 0 . 42 0 . 50 
⎤ 
⎥ ⎦ . 
otice that this new set of preference matrices preserves the rela- 
ionships of dominance described in i) and ii) above; however the 
egrees by which the third alternative dominates the first and the 
econd one have been increased, although they remain lower than 
he corresponding ones of the fourth alternative. 
After normalization according to Eq. (6) from Section 3.1 we ob- 
ain the following stochastic centrality matrices: 
 3 = 
⎡ 
⎢ ⎣ 
0 . 30 0 . 13 0 . 27 0 . 30 
0 . 20 0 . 20 0 . 28 0 . 32 
0 . 07 0 . 05 0 . 73 0 . 15 
0 . 03 0 . 02 0 . 18 0 . 77 
⎤ 
⎥ ⎦ , 
 4 = 
⎡ 
⎢ ⎣ 
0 . 25 0 . 15 0 . 28 0 . 32 
0 . 18 0 . 23 0 . 27 0 . 32 
0 . 05 0 . 07 0 . 74 0 . 14 
0 . 02 0 . 02 0 . 19 0 . 77 
⎤ 
⎥ ⎦ . 
Again we apply the two GDM strategies described above 
NF+WA and RC+WA). The outcomes are: 
utput NF+WA = 
[
−0 . 45 −0 . 567 0 . 477 0 . 54 
]
utput RC+WA = 
[
0 . 065 0 . 054 0 . 441 0 . 439 
]
, 
ith corresponding rankings: 
ank NF+WA = 
[
4 3 1 2 
]
ank RC+WA = 
[
3 4 1 2 
]
. 
his time, the results differ in the ordering of the third and the 
orth alternative. The difference in the results between the first and 
he second scenario shows that the approach based on rank cen- 
rality has a distinctive sensitivity to the magnitude of the relations 
f preference among the alternatives. In particular, the approach 
ased on RC+WA may rank higher alternatives that marginally 
ominate weak alternatives but also marginally dominate strong 
lternatives. This is consistent with the interpretation of rank cen- 
rality provided in ( Negahban et al., 2012; 2016 ). 
A. Yazidi, M. Ivanovska, F.M. Zennaro et al. European Journal of Operational Research 297 (2022) 1030–1041 



































Estimates of all first passages times ˆ ti j according to Eq. (26) for matrix S 1 , com- 
pared with the values computed directly from the respective Markov chain simu- 
lation. 
k/l 1 2 3 4 
1 — ˆ t12 = 11 . 7042 ˆ t13 = 12 . 7304 ˆ t14 = 15 . 1242 
ˆ t21 = 16 . 3057 ˆ t31 = 4 . 8454 ˆ t41 = 4 . 1701 
t 12 = 11 . 7039 t 13 = 12 . 7326 t 14 = 15 . 1259 
t 21 = 16 . 3063 t 31 = 4 . 8463 t 41 = 4 . 1706 
2 ˆ t21 = 16 . 3057 — ˆ t23 = 16 . 8106 ˆ t24 = 19 . 8224 
ˆ t12 = 11 . 7024 ˆ t32 = 4 . 7643 ˆ t42 = 4 . 1132 
t 21 = 16 . 3063 t 23 = 16 . 8135 t 24 = 19 . 8258 
t 12 = 11 . 7039 t 32 = 4 . 7653 t 42 = 4 . 1140 
3 ˆ t31 = 4 . 8473 ˆ t32 = 4 . 7665 — ˆ t34 = 5 . 3176 
ˆ t13 = 12 . 7349 ˆ t23 = 16 . 8167 ˆ t43 = 5 . 2789 
t 31 = 4 . 8463 t 32 = 4 . 7653 t 34 = 5 . 3184 
t 13 = 12 . 7326 t 23 = 16 . 8135 t 43 = 5 . 2797 
4 ˆ t41 = 4 . 1713 ˆ t42 = 4 . 1148 ˆ t43 = 5 . 2805 —
ˆ t14 = 15 . 1280 ˆ t24 = 19 . 8291 ˆ t34 = 5 . 3192 
t 41 = 4 . 1706 t 42 = 4 . 1140 t 43 = 5 . 2797 

















p 32 12  
9 Thus the aggregated preference strength of the alternative 3 will increase. .2. Experimental sensitivity analysis 
In this section we perform experimental sensitivity analysis, in- 
estigating how the result of the group decision making changes 
nder a perturbation of amplitude ε in the initial preference matri- 
es. We restrict to the case when only one of the initial preference 
atrices changes in only one pair of alternatives, and we observe 
ow various degrees of change affect the result. We consider again 
he first scenario we presented in the previous simulation, but this 
ime we instantiate a parametric version of the matrix P 1 for the 
rst expert: 
˜ 
 1 (ε) = 
⎡ 
⎢ ⎣ 
0 . 50 0 . 60 0 . 30 − ε 0 . 10 
0 . 40 0 . 50 0 . 25 0 . 05 
0 . 70 + ε 0 . 75 0 . 50 0 . 55 
0 . 90 0 . 95 0 . 45 0 . 50 
⎤ 
⎥ ⎦ (30) 
ith the parameter ε assuming values in the interval [0,0.3) in or- 
er to satisfy the requirement that, for every entry, 0 < p i j < 1 . The
parameter allows us to increase the margin of the preference of 
he third alternative over the first, and, consequently, to narrow 
he gap between the third and the fourth alternative. The prefer- 
nce matrix of the second expert is taken to be the same fixed 
atrix P 2 used in the previous section. We then apply the two di- 
ect methods we considered before (NF+WA and RC+WA) to the 
atrices ˜ P 1 (ε) and P 2 , while changing the value of the parameter 
. 
Fig. 2 shows the variation in the output of the two methods as 
 function of the parameter ε. The results show that the two direct 
ethods respond differently to similar changes. As the parameter 
increases, the gap between the third and the fourth alternative 
arrows more significantly when using RC+WA instead of NF+WA. 
his change also leads to a decrease in the value of the first al- 
ernative that is more marked for the RC+WA method; indeed, for 
alues of ε around 0.20 the first alternative becomes less prefer- 
ble than the second one; for the range of ε that we considered, 
e do not notice a similar change in the ordering of the first and
he second alternative in the NF+WA method. 
When applying RC+WA in a scenario with many alternatives 
here we only perturb one pair of them, it is not always obvi- 
us how this perturbation will reflect on the resulting preference 
trengths of the alternatives: which of them will have their pref- 1038 rence strengths increased or decreased and for how much. As we 
ill see, our theoretical perturbation analysis given by Eq. (24) can 
redict and interpret the changes based on the mean first pas- 
age times and the magnitudes of the preference strengths. The 
rue mean first passage times are given in Table 1 . In our case,
he pair that is changed is (x k , x l ) = (3 , 1) . As per our theoretical
esults, the preference strength of the alternative 3 for expert 1 
omputed by RC will increase proportionally to t 13 = 12 . 7326 mod- 
rated by the strength π(1) 
3 
of the alternative itself. 9 Similarly the 
reference strength of the alternative 1 for expert 1 computed by 
C will decrease proportionally to t 31 = 4 . 8463 moderated by the 
trength π(1) 
1 
of the alternative itself. But what about the rest of 
lternatives? The changes in the preference strength of the alterna- 
ive 4 for expert 1 is proportional to t 34 − t 14 = 5 . 3184 − 15 . 1259 =
9 . 8075 moderated by π(1) 
4 
, meaning it will decrease. For alterna- 
ive 2, the changes in the preference strength for the first expert is 
roportional to t − t = 4 . 7653 − 11 . 7039 = −6 . 9386 moderated
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Fig. 3. Deviation of each component of the perturbed stationary distribution ˜ π(ε) 
in percentage of the respective component of the unperturbed stationary distribu- 
tion π(0) , when the preference matrix is changed for one single pair of alternatives 


























































y the strength the alternative itself π(1) 
2 
. Since π(1) 
2 
is small, the 
agnitude of the latter changes is small too as can be seen in the 
ggregated weighted ranking given in Fig. 2 . 
To end the sensitivity analysis for this particular numerical 
xperiment, we fix the perturbation amplitude at a small value, 
amely ε = 0 . 001 , and apply it to each pair of alternatives (x k , x l )
n the matrix P 1 . The results are shown in Fig. 3 . While the larger
eviations are typically observed for the components of the sta- 
ionary distribution associated with the perturbed pair, namely πk 
nd πl , one also observes significant changes in the other compo- 
ents. For example, when perturbing the pair (4,2) one observes 
lso a significant change in the amplitude of the first component, 
nd when perturbing the pair (3,4), all components are signifi- 
antly affected. Note that, in all cases the deviations for (x k , x l ) and
x l , x k ) are symmetric, as expected from Eq. (25) . 
Finally, in Fig. 4 we show the difference of the first passage 
imes, t li − t ki , for each perturbated pair of alternatives (x k , x l ) con-
idered in Fig. 3 , as computed directly from Eq. (25) . Similarly, one
lso observes cases where the perturbation of one particular pair 
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ig. 4. For each perturbation of the preference matrix shown in Fig. 3 one plots the 
ifference of first passage times, t li − t ki , from each alternative x i to each alternative 
f the perturbed pair (x k , x l ) . The values were obtained by solving Eq. (25) for t li −




















1039 ernative to the alternatives in the perturbed pair. Moreover, ap- 
lying Eq. (26) we estimate the first passage times for all pairs of 
lternatives. Notice that, repeating the numerical experiment in- 
erchanging the role of k and l enables to make two estimates for 
ach first passage time. As shown in Tab. 1 , in all the cases both
stimates are close to each other, showing the ability of our pro- 
edure for estimating this dynamical property of consensus pro- 
esses. 
. Conclusions and future work 
In this paper we have presented a direct approach to aggregat- 
ng fuzzy preference relations proposing a GDM method based on 
ank centrality. The method has the advantage of providing a natu- 
al interpretation of the preference degrees as transition probabil- 
ties in a Markov chain and obtaining the corresponding weighted 
ankings by well-established computational methods. Moreover, as 
e show with our numerical examples, our approach shows more 
ensitivity to small variations in the preference values compared to 
ther similar approaches. 
The natural next step is to design an experiment to test our 
ramework and compare it with other GDM with FPR frameworks 
n the literature. We have implemented an online platform for col- 
ecting data during an iterative process towards consensus, which 
ill enable to investigate the distances in the opinion space, either 
o the collective opinion, or pairwise distances between experts’ 
pinions. In this way we can test our framework for modelling 
rocesses towards reaching a consensus, and examine which ini- 
ial preference matrices lead to a consensual opinion. Finally, such 
xperimental setup will also enable to investigate the time inter- 
al needed for achieving consensus in various real-life applications, 
nd determine which framework enables the fastest converging it- 
rative processes. Moreover, investigating the inconsistency ( Kou, 
rgu, & Shang, 2014; Kou & Lin, 2014; Lin, Kou, Peng, & Alsaadi, 
020 ) directly from a centrality matrix is a future research direc- 
ion worth investigating. 
We hope that the current work can fuel more research interest 
n bridging the gap between the GDM community and researchers 
n probability theory and its applications. 
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ppendix A. Irreducibility and aperiodicity of the stochastic 
atrix 
A Markov chain is irreducible if it is possible to get to any 
tate from any state. Clearly, if the stochastic matrix S of a Markov 
hain with n states satisfies the condition: s i j > 0 , for every i, j ∈
 1 , . . . , n } , then it (and so the Markov chain) is irreducible. The
bove condition is easy to prove under the assumption we made 
n Eq. (7) . Namely, from Eq. (6a) and the assumption p i j > 0 (fol-
owing from Eq. (7) ), it follows that s i j > 0 , for every i  = j. If we
uppose that s ii = 0 for some i , then, from Eq. (6b) , it will follows
hat 
∑ 
i = j p i j = n − 1 . From this and the fact that p i j ∈ [0 , 1] , it fol-
ows p i j = 1 , for i  = j, which is in contradiction with the assump-
ion p i j  = 1 (again following from Eq. (7) ). 
It is easy to observe that the centrality matrix and the corre- 
ponding Markov chain are aperiodic. For a Markov chain to be 
periodic, every state has to be aperiodic, that is, for any state i 
he greatest common divisor of the number of steps k that it may 
ake to return to i is 1. Now, from Eq. (6) and from the discus-
ion on irreducibility, we have that s i j > 0 for all i, j. Therefore, for














































10 Matrix A ∗ is also called ”Drazin inverse” of Laplacian, which according to 
Mahadevan et al. (2009) ”reveals a great deal of information about the structure of 
the Markov chain ”. ny state i , there is a non-zero probability of returning to state i 
n k steps, for k = { 1 , 2 , 3 , . . . } . The greatest common divisor of this 
umber of steps is then 1. Thus every state i is aperiodic, and the 
arkov chain with its associated centrality matrix is aperiodic. 
ppendix B. Proof of Theorem 1 
To prove Theorem 1 , let us consider a BTL model with parame- 
er vector π such that p i j = πi πi + π j . Let M i j be the number of sam-
le comparisons between x i and x j and m i j the samples in which 
lternative x i wins over x j . Hence, there is a real number, M, such
hat 
 i j = m i j + m ji ≡
⌈
M(πi + π j ) 
⌉
. (B.1) 
here  .  denotes the operator that rounds to nearest integer. In 
hat follows we will only need the limit of large values of M i j 
i.e. M i j → ∞ ) for which M → ∞ and 
⌈
M(πi + π j ) 
⌉
→ M(πi + π j ) . 
Under the assumption of independent and identically dis- 
ributed samples, the likelihood function of the BTL model is given 
y: 





j  = i 
p 







j  = i 
(
πi 
πi + π j 
)m i j 
, (B.2) 
here we disregard the case πi = 0 , which only occurs in the 
pathological” case where for some j  = i , p i j = 0 . We take the log-
ikelihood function of (B.2) 




j =1 , j = i 
m i j log 
πi 
πi + π j 
. (B.3) 
o find the Maximum Likelihood Estimate (MLE) of the BTL model 
e take the partial derivative of the likelihood function with re- 
pect to the parameters of the model: 




j =1 , j = i 
(
m i j 
1 
πi 
− (m i j + m ji ) 
1 




j =1 , j = i 
(




πi + π j 
) − m ji 
1 




j =1 , j = i 
(




πi + π j 
− m ji 
1 





j =1 , j = i 
(
m i j 
π j 
πi + π j 
− m ji 
πi 
πi + π j 
)
We determine the MLE π ∗ as the value of π at which the par- 
ial derivatives are zero, that is: 
n ∑ 
j =1 , j = i 


















y applying the law of large numbers, p i j can also be defined as: 
p i j = lim 
M i j →∞ 
m i j 
M i j 
= lim 
M→∞ 
m i j 
M(πi + π j ) 
= lim 
M→∞ 










≈ πi + π j by 
irtue of the MLE. Similarly, 








ence in the limit of M → ∞ 
 i j = p i j M(π ∗i + π ∗j ) (B.5) 
nd 
 ji = p ji M(π ∗i + π ∗j ) . (B.6) 1040 y substituting Eq. (B.5) and Eq. (B.6) in Eq. (B.4) we obtain 
n ∑ 
j =1 , j = i 
p i j M(π
∗









j =1 , j = i 
p ji M(π
∗








hich yields the following global balance equation: 
n ∑ 
j =1 , j = i 








ppendix C. Proof of Theorem 2 
Let A ∗ be the group inverse of A = I − S ( Golub & Meyer, 1986 ),
.e. A ∗ is the unique matrix 10 satisfying the three equations AA ∗A = 
 , A ∗AA ∗ = A ∗ and A ∗A = AA ∗. Let a ∗
i j 
denote the entries of A ∗, and
et A ∗∗i be the i-th column of A 
∗. Then, we can apply Theorem 3.2
rom Golub and Meyer ( Golub & Meyer, 1986 ) to study the sensi-
ivity of the ranking to changes of ε, namely: 
∂ ˜ πi (ε) 
∂ε
= ˜ π(ε) ∂ ̃
 S (ε) 
∂ε
A ∗∗i = ˜ π(ε) 
∂S ε (ε) 
∂ε
A ∗∗i , (C.1) 
here 
∂S ε (ε) 
∂ε
= 
k l ⎛ 
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎝ 
⎞ 
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎠ 
0 . . . 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . . . . 
. . . 
0 . . . 1 
n −1 . . . − 1 n −1 . . . 0 k 
. . . . . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . . . . 
. . . 
0 . . . 1 
n −1 . . . − 1 n −1 . . . 0 l 
. . . . . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
0 . . . 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 
(C.2) 
Let e i = (0 , . . . , 0 , 1 , 0 , . . . , 0) T be the unit vector with entries δik 
or k = 1 , . . . , n . Then, ∂S ε (ε) 
∂ε
can be written as 
∂S ε (ε) 
∂ε
= 1 
n − 1 [ e k  e k − e k  e l − e l  e l + e l  e k ] , 
here  denotes the tensor product between unit vectors. Substi- 
uting this expression in Eq. (C.1) yields 
∂ ˜ πi (ε) 
∂ε
= 1 







(e k  e k ) rs − (e k  e l ) rs 









˜ πr (δkr δks − δkr δls 
−δlr δls + δlr δks ) a ∗si 
= 1 
n − 1 ( ̃  πk a 
∗
ki − ˜ πk a ∗li − ˜ πl a ∗li + ˜ πl a ∗ki ) 
= ˜ πk + ˜ πl 
n − 1 (a 
∗
ki − a ∗li ) , (C.3) 
here δi j is the Kronecker-delta, δi j = 1 if i = j and zero otherwise. 





















































Z  According to Cho and Meyer ( Cho & Meyer, 20 0 0 ), A ∗ is diago-
ally dominant over the columns, meaning that for all pairs (i, j) 
 
∗
ji = a ∗ii − t ji πi (C.4) 
here t ji denotes the mean first passage time from x i to x j . Intro-
ucing Eq. (C.4) in Eq. (C.3) yields Eq. (24) in Theorem 2 . 
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